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INsunANcE CoNSUMER CouNsELts Colulvttt
THB Durv Or Tne AcBNr OR BRoxnn To RecoN,tN,reNro
UNnrnrNsuRBo MotoRrs'r CovrRecB Vttu Aoequare LruIts
¡v PRopsssos Cnp,c Muxao

$25,000limits of UIM.

agent or broker hzve any duty in
Montana to recommend a particular coverage in a specific adequate
amount? More specificall¡ what is
the agent or broker's duty, if an¡
to recommend that the insured
purchase UIM coverage and do so

the policy contained exclusions or
conditions that made the coverage
illusory for the client. Often the
client has the right coverage, but

The Issue in Montana
The problem of absence or
inadequacy of UIM coverage pre-

with an adequate limit of liability?
In this article, I will focus on the
agent's duty to explain and recommend auto UIM coverage, though

under limits of liability that are
patently inadequate given the cli-

statutory requirement for even

Trial lawyers are all too
famlliar with cases in which an
insured has purchased coverage
that wasn't appropriate for the
client's situation, either because
the basic insuring agreement in
the policy did not cover a foresee-

remedy it. Ultimately, the only
thing worse than learning that the
defendant driver only carried minimum ($25,000) BI limits is to find
out your otherwise well-insured
client has no UIM coverage or

able risk in the client's affairs or

ent's circumstances. Sometimes,
for no apparent reason, the otherwise well-insured client simply
lacks a single coverage important
to the protection of that client.
Too often, the client who has
failed to secure the proper coverage in the correct amounts has

supposedly had the benefit of an
agent or broker in buying the insurance. Ironicall¡ that agent or
broker's insurance agency mày
have advertised using language

such as "meeting all of your insurance needs."
An all too common example
of the problem is that of auto insurance clients who carry policies
containing substantial limits of

Bodily Injury @I), Properry Damage (?D), Medical Pay (X4P), and
even Uninsured Motorist (UIVD
coverage but have no Underinsured (Jllvf) coverage or only
$25,000 of UIM coverage. When
pressed by their counsel about
that zpparent inconsistency, the
client will likely display a complete
lack of knowledge about the import of the problem or the fact
that an agent or broker has not
made any recommendation to
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sents so clearly because there is no
a

minimum limit of such coverage
in Montana. BI and PD coverages
are mandated in Montana in minimum amounts by the Mandatory
Liability Protection Act, $6 1-6-301
and the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, MCA 561-6-103

xq. Also, auto insurance carriers
are required to offer UM coverage
et.

under MCA 533-23-201.. F{owever,
there is no equivalent statute requiring carriers to offer UIM
coverage.

This is ironic, because passage o[ the Mandatory Liability
Protection Âct in 1979 created the
market for UIM coverage given
that it meant more people in the
state who drove uninsured before
1,979 would be coerced into dtivingwith minimum limits after
enactment. This in effect rendered
the UM coverage of the victims
of those minimally insured drivers
useless and left the victims at the
mercy of BI policy limits inadequate to pay for a single week in a
hospital.

Given that insurers don't
UIM in Montana and
its importance for protection of
the state's motorists, the pressing
question is: Does an insurance
have to offer

the law and arguments discussed
can be extrapolated to other coveraç lines such as homeowners or
commercial general liability.
Those lawyers who started
practice even as late in the century
as the 1970s will remember when
¡ye resolved most insurance questions by looking to California
cases, there being a death ofcase
authority in Montana. In spite of
the diligence with which the
Montana Supreme Court has
issued insurance opinions in the
last 30 years, there are still occasional issues for which case law
does not exist in the state. The
specific question of the agent or
broker's duty to recommend UIM
insurance is one such issue. However, NewJersey in part-icular has
developed a significant line of
common law cases on this issue
that span both the period before
New Jersey statutotily required
UIM coverage in 19841 and the
period during which the state has
required the coverage. The cases
contain some well-reasoned law on
the duty of agents and brokers in
this situation, and, for that reason,

I will

base a good deal of this arti-

cle on those precedents hoping
they may be persuasive in Montana.Beforc doing so, however,

Prce

it

25

llMontzlabw on the general Juties of
agents and brokãrs in procuring
irl1,rrance for the insuied and in
advising the insured.

is good to review existing

Montâna Case Law on the General Duty to Procure Insurance
Our Seminal authority on
the agent's duty to procure

un Gty u.
", State
Lauina
Bankzwas decided in 1921.

The Lavina State
Bank operated an
insurarrce

insur-

with a company selected by
the assured, or, in the absence o[ any selection by
him, then with a company
selected by such

broker.

The coutt noted, "Every
broker is in a sense an agent, but
every agent is not a broker," dìfferentiating the broker by the fact

faithfully discharge the trust
reposed in him, and he may
become liable in damages
for breach of duty. If he is
instructecl to procure specific insurance and fails to
do so, he is liable to his
principal for the damage
suffered by reason of the
want of such insurance. The
liabilitY of

lllllillllll

:

the agent

with resPect

i
Negligence on the part of the agent defeating in whole or
in part the insurance that he is directed to secure will
render him liable to his principal for the resulting loss.

to the loss is
that which

would have

busi-

fallen uPon

ness through its

vice president

who wrote hail insurance for
Flartford Fire Insurance Com-

pany. Plaintiff,Gay, zlocal farmer,
sig"ed a promissory note with the

bank inJune to pay for hail insurance for which he applied. The
bank, which later contended the
hail insurance deal was expressly
conditioned on approval of the
transaction by its cashier, mailed u
letter to plaintiff within days refusing the transaction unless the
promissory note was secured.
Þlaintiff, who denied the deal was
conditional, took no action on the
letter, and subsequently made a
$1,000 claim when the crop was
later damaged by hail in August.
The court treated the claim
as one for breach of the contract
to procure insurance and found
that the bank was a broker as opposed to an

agent.

An insurance broker is one
who acts as a middleman
between the assured and
the insurer, and who solicits .
insurance from the public

from
any special company, but,
having secured an order, he
either places the insurance

under no employment

Ptcn26

had the in-

that, as an intetmediary or middleman, he accepts insurance applications and "acts in a certain sense

of both parties to the
transactron." Also, the court found
exclusivity or rathe r lack of it to be
a distinguishing factor. T'he court
stated the broker's liability in such
circumstances as follows:
as the agent

surance been effected

as

contemplated. Negligence
on the part of the agent defeating in whole or in part
the insurance that he is directed to secure will render

him liable to hus principal
for the resulting loss.

Gty

v.

Lauina State Bank

An agent who takes his

is often quoted and still good law

principal's money under

on the duty of the agent or broker
to procure insurance. One of the
initial questions in claiming a duty
to procure is whether the intermedi-

an
to
proexpress agreement
cure insurance, and unjustifiably fails to secure the
same or make an effort
in that direction, hereby
assumes the risk and becomes liable, in case of loss,
to pzy as much oF the same
as would have been covered
by the insurance policy for
which his principal had
paid, provided the same had
been procured as directed.
insured
broker
authorized by him to procure insurance, there is the
usual obligation on the part
of the latter to carry out the
instmctions given hrm and

And

as between the

and his own agent or

ary is an agent of the insured or an
agent of the insurer ot both. In

Marie Deoníer & Assoc. u- PauI
Revere life Ins. Co.r3 the court
held that "a soliciting açnt of an
insurance company is the açnt of
the insurer and not of the ìnsured
for the pulpose of soliciting and procuring the insurance and preparing
the applicatron." The court established that an independent insurance
broker who ìs authorized to solicit
applicatrons from insureds zLnd procure the sale of the insurels policies
is an agent of the insurerwith tespect to duties owed by the insurer
to its açnts. The corollary is that the

açnt's negligence in failing to pro-
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cure insurance can be imputed to
the insurer in such a czse.

The Clienfs Request for Insurance
In the 1983 case of Lee u.
Andtews,a plarntrff, Iæe, brought
an action for breach ofcontract to
procure auto insurance. Iæe had a
long-term relationship with Andrews, an agent for State Farm,
and had at times
carried auto, fire,
and life insurance

policies through
hum. When Lee
wanted to lease a
car,he told An-

trial in State District Couft against
Jim Andrews on the single clarm
oIbreach of contract to procure
insurance. The iury found Andrews liable but also found l-ee's
conduct had prevented the procurement. The Montana Supreme
Court granted tæe a iudgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanded for a new trial on dam-

would be likely to result there
from.' S27-1-31 1, MC.A."
R.If. Gtovet, fnc. u. Flynn
Ins. Co.rs cited Zee u. Andtews;
to confirm that, in order to place
an agent under a duty to procure,
Montana law "requires a client's
request to procure certain insurance, followed by an agent's commitment to do the same." In
Gtove4 the
court found no
duty to procure

attorney fees in that action, and the damages
resulting from having to borrow money at 20 percent
interest are all proper evidence of damages.tt

drews he would
need insurance.
Andrews said he "would take carc

of it." As the court later noted,
"They did not discuss the amount
of coverage, the terms of the policy, the amount of the premium,
or the names of the insureds."
However, the lessor of the vehicle
later called the ,{.ndrews agency to
verifir insurance to satis$r GMAC,
the vehicle's financier. Andrew's
wife apparently provided the lessor information that the limits
would be $100,000/$300,000 and
$25,000 for property damage and
fhat"itwould be taken c^re of."
She left a note forJim Andrews
with the year, make, model, and
serial number of the auto and the
coverage sought. GMAC apparently also made telephone confirmatìon of the insurance with the
Andrews agency. Læe never filled
out an application or paid ar,.y premium, and no policy was issued.
Three months later, Iæe colIided with a motorcyclist and suffered a $152,000 judgment for the
motorcyclist's injuries and damages at which point State Farm denied the existence of any policy or
coverage. State Farm won a declaratory action in Federal Court
and ultimately proceeded to iury

where the
àgerrcy mistakenly issued a
general contractor a cefttficzte
as

In doing so, the court
cleaÃy had to supply much oFthe

ages alone.

subject of the insurance by implication or inference, the insured
having provided the agent with
little more than the fact that he
wanted auto insurance in order to
lease an Oldsmobile Toronado.
With regard to damages, the

court cited Gay u. Lauina State
Bank for the proposition that, ìn a
case for failure to procure insurance, the measure of damages "is
that which would have fallen upon

proof that

a

:

l

t1

l

subcontractor had insurance when,

ìn fzct, no such insurance existed.
The court said ¡vith no duty to
procure, no contract could be
created where there was no offer
or acceptance, just a mistake in
issuing a certificate.
The insured's duties were
further developed in McKeuitt v.
MungerrT where a contractor who
needed an insurance bond to place
a bid for an insurance contract
waited until the last minute to request that the agent get the bond,
sent the application to town in his
friend's trucþ and was out of communication while the agent tried

the company had the insurance
been effected as contemplated"
including costs of defense and the
damage award to the amount of its
policy. However, the court also
noted that "damages from the
[underlying] $Tilson judgment, attorney fees in that action, and the
damages resulting from having to
borrow money at 20 percent interest are all proper evidence of damages." As the court explained,
"Montana law provides that the
measure of damages for breach of

unsuccessfully to acquire the bond.
In the circumstances, the court refused to impose a duty to procure
on the agent. Instead, in dicta; the
court recognized a duty of the insured to (1) let açnt knowwhere he
is, (2) allow time for the açnCs best
efforts, (3) make the application

contract 'is the amount which will
compensate the party aggrieved
for all the detriment which was
proximately caused thereby or in
the ordinary course of things

the court decided the insured has
no absolute duty to read the policy
to determine whether the agent
has procured the insurance sought.
Rather, the court said the isle is

timely.

In Fillinger v. l{otthwestem Agency, Inc. of Great FaIIs,s

To þa¿e
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reasonably would be unreasonable in the circumstances not to do so.
clear request for insurance and the
One can see that the general
it,
procure
the
to
undertakes
zgent
law
of
the agent's duty in Montana
If
the
agent has a duty to procure.
does not address our specifìc quesaçnt breaches that duty by not
tion, whether the automobile inmaking reasonable efforts to prosurance agent has a duty to explain
or
timely
procuring
either
cure
and
circumstanðes it is unreasonable
and recommend UIM coverâge to
notiÊ7ing of the inability to pronot to rcad it.', The court also
afl insured in
quoted with apMontana. This
¡l¡ll¡lll¡
pror.al
^"tut"issue was raised
ment from
^
has no
insured
is
procured,
the
insurance
the
Once
in
FederalJudge
pennsyl1978
determine
policy
to
the
analyze
read
and
to
Molloy's
court by
absolute duty
vania case of
Gary T.zdtckin
whether the agent has procured the right coverage.
Fiorcntino v.
Moss
v' State
Ttavelets Ins.
Farm
Mut
Co.:s

whether it is unreasonable in the
circumstances not to do so. In
Fillingetrthe court approved à
jury in-struction that ,"iã, "An in,.r.^.. policyholder has no duty
to read ti.t" påt.y unless under the

ance client makes a

l

Auto. fns. Co.,

When the insured informs
the agent of his insurance
needs and the agent's conduct permits a reasonable
inference that he was highly
skilled in this are4 the insureds reliance on the agent
to obtain the coveraç that he
has represented that he will
obtain is fustifiable. The insured does not have an abso-

lute duty to read the policy,
but rather only the duty to act
reasonably under the circumstances. The circumstances
varywith the facts of each
case, and depend on the relationslup between the

agent and the insured.

Also import ant in Fillinger
is the court's holding that it is
witlun the common experience
and knowledge of lay iurors to determine whether an insurance
agent reasonably fulfilled his or

het duty and procured the coverage requested.

Summary of Montana Law on
General Duty to Procure
From the foregoing cases,
Montana law regarding the agent's
duty to procute might include the
following princrples: If the insur-
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cure, then the agent is liable for
the full amount of damages the
insurer would have incurred if the
insurance had been in place. The
client, on the other hand, must
place a clear order, make it timely
so that the insurance can be procured, and be available for communication about the application.
Whether the intermediary's
negligence in not procuring insutance can be imputed to the insurance company depends on the intermediary's status. If he is a soliciting agent for the insurer, his negligence may be imputed under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. If
he is a broker, that is, one taking
offers from insureds and selecting
insurers and placing insurance with
them, then he owes a duty to procure insurance to the insured but is
not deemed
zgent of the in^n
surer, so that his negligence will
not be imputed. In that circumstance, the insured will have to
look only to the broker for compensation if the broker negligently
fails to procure the insurance.
Once the insurance is procured,
the insured has no absolute duty to
read and znalyze the policy to determine whether the agent has

procured the right coverage. That
duty may exist, however, if it

28 M.þ-.R. 204 Q00I). There, the
parties stipulated that State Farm's
agent had not advised Mosses of
the existence of UIM and that
Mosses would have purchased it
had the agent done so. Zadtck ugued that the court should decide

of law in summary
judgment that the agent has a duty
at common law to offer the insured UIM coverage. Judge Molloy
declined to do so and ruled that
the issue of whethet there was
such a duty in the circumstances
was for the jury to decide. Judge
Molloy indicated that the fact that
the insurer's own manuals instructed the agent to offer UIM
was not a basis for a finding of
negligence per se but was evidence
that the jury could consider in detetmining whether the agent had a
duty to offer UIM. Because Montanahas not answered the question whether the agent has a common law duty to offer UIM coverage,it is good to review the line of
cases in which the NewJersey
courts have dealt with this issue.
as a matter

NewJersey's Line of Cases on
the Specific Duty to Recommend UIM Coverage
We begin our look at New
Jersey's common law on the

Tnnr TnBNos
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agent's duty with

Ridet

v.

Lynchlo

ìn1964. The case achrally involved
auto BI coverage, but in remanding
the case for trial against the agent
for failing to recommend the
needed coverage, the court set out
an oft-quoted statement that would
make an excellent jury instnrction:
One who holds himself out
to the public as an insurance
broker is required to have
the degree of skill and
knowledge requisite to the
calling. ìVhen engaged by a
member of the public to obtain insurance, the law holds
him to the exercise of good

faith and to possess reasonable knowledge of the types
of policies, their different
terms, and the coverage
availalle in the area in which
his principal seeks to be protected. If he neglects to procure the insurance or if the
policy is void or rnatenally
deficient or does not provide
the coverage he undertook
to supply, because of his failure to exercise the requisite
skill or diligence, he becomes
liable to his principal for the
loss sustained thereby.

The court made a second
statement regarding request by implication that has become a quoted
companion in subsequent decisions
and would also make an excellent
jury instruction:
Thus, an insurance broker, in
dealingwith his client, ordinarily invites them to rely
upon his expertise in procuring insurance that best suits
their requirements. It is not
necessary for the client in
order to establish a breach of
duty to prove that he laid out
for the broker the elements
of a contract ofinsurance. It
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Montana
Pattern
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Instructions
The Montana Trial

Lawyers

Association MPI Committee is
committed to developing and
maintaining the best possible set of
pattern instructions. The Committee

welcomes suggestions from MTLA
members, especially

in developing

areas of the law or in areas where
there are presently no published
pattern instructions.

lf you have suggestions,
please contact:
Mike Wheat, Chairman
MTLA MPI Committee
P.O. Box 838
Helena, MT 59624
Or email them

to: trial@mt.net
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is sufficient to show that he

authorized procurement

oI

the insurance needed to
cover the risks indicated
and that the broker agreed
to do so but failed or neglected to perform his duty.

The terms of the contract
to procure
the insurance, the
scope ofthe

be covered,
may be

a valid contract.

This law from Ridetwas
subsequently quoted and made the
basis of the NewJersey case of
Johnson v. MacMillanrll which
follows and is particulady compelling on the issue of the agent's
duty to advise the client of UIM
covefage.

The Duty to Advise of Availability of UIM Coverage
In 1983, plaintiffs CaÃ and
Mildred Johnson) were severely
in¡ured in a collision with a cat
driven by McMillan who only carried the minimum $15,000/
$30,000 BI covetage required by
the State of NewJersey. The
Johnson policy contained no Underinsured Motorist (UIM coverage. Johnsons had, since the

of their home-

owners, commercial, and auto insurarice through agent, Guy

Puffer, President of the Puffer
Agency, Inc. Puffer testified that
he personally attended to John-

son's insurance needs and that

Pece 32

The Duty to Advise of Higher

Limits
Whether the
agent has a duty
to advise the insured of the

of
limits of

availability
higher

UIM

found by implication. The principal
does not sue on z contrzct
ofinsurance; he seeks recovery for the loss occasioned by the failure to procure such a contrzct or such

1950s, bought all

not imputed to the insurer but
born only by Puffer. Accordingly,
it was error for the trial court to
reform Selective's policy, and
Johnson's recovery was limited to
liability of Puffer.

iudge's conclusion tlnat"an insurance agent has an
affirmative duty to advise his client of the availability of
higher monetary limits for the coverage requested.tt

risk and subject matter to

I

Johnsons followed hts recommendations. He placed Johnson's auto insurance with
Selective Risks Insurance Company with whom he had entered
an "Agency Agreement" by
which he was an independent
contractor in a non-exclusive

coverage is

the next ques-

relationshrp. Johnson's policy
with Selective covered four vehicles for $200,000 liability, but provided the minimum UM coverage
of $15,000/$30,000 and no UIM
coverage.

Puffer admitted that he
never advised Johnsons about
the existence of UIM coverage
because he didn't know about it.

However, evidence attÀal showed
that the insurer, Selective Risks,
sent its agent/brokers notice of
availability of the coverage in 1973
and again in 1983. Also, Puffer apparently received ISO mailings on
UIM coverage. The trial court
found Puffer negligent and determined thatJohnsons would have
purchased $200,000 UIM coverage
if they had been advised of it. The
court reformed the insurer's contract to include UIM coverage in
that amount.
On appeal, the court quoted
the above statements from Rider
and affirmed that the agenthad a
duty to explain and recommend

UIM to theJohnsons. The court
agreed that Johnsons, if told,
would have purchased $200,000
limits of UIM coverage. However,
it also found that the Puffer
agency was ân independent con-

tnactot, so that its negligence was

tion. In the NewJersey case of
Sobotor v. Pndential Prop. &
Cas.

Ins. Co.,rz

the insured asked

the agent for BI limits of
$100,000/$300,000 and also indicated he wanted the "NewJersey
package that is the best avzilalle."
The agent provided him BI limits
of $100,000/$300,000 and UIM
coverage for only the stah"rtory

minimum limit of $15,000 even
though Prudential offered UIM of
$100,000/$300,000 for an additional $5 premium.
The appellate court in
Sobotot afftrmed the trial judge's
conclusion lhzt " an insurance
agent has an afftrmatle duty to
advise his client of the availability
of higher monetary limits for the
coverage requested." The court
found that the duty is owed regardless of whether the intermediary is an agent or a broker, since
each owes the same duty to the
insured, the difference only lying
in therr duties to their insurance
companies. l(/hether the agent has
a duty to advise of additional insurance cove(age depends on the

particular relationship between the
insured and the agent or broker.13
It depends on the agent's holding
himself out as having special expertise in insurancela and may de-
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pend on the length of the relationship between agent and insured.ls
Howevet, the court ín Sobotot
said:

The "fiduciary'nature o[
such a relationship should
not depend on the length of
the relationship. Because of
the increasing complexity of
the insurance industry and
the speci alized knowledge
required to understand all of
its intricacies, the relationshrp between an insurance
4gent and a client is often a

pertise with every client, not
only those with whom they

have a long-term relation-

thip."
The insurer in Sobotot also
contended that the duty owed the
insured is limited to what the insured "specifically and expressly
requested." Howevef, the court
found that argument did not
"negate the existence of a fiduciary
duty to inform respondent of the
additional coverage" and that the
client's request for the "best available" coverage actually invoked
the duty.
Finally, the court noted the
role of adhesion contracts in its
reasoning by quotrng from the ear.

lfat

v.

^îrangement. Recognition is gven
to the usual and justifiable
reliance by the purchaser
on the agent, because of
his special knowledge, to
obtain, the protection he
desires and needs, and on
the agent's representation,
whether that agent be a socalled'independent' but authorized representative of
the insurer, or only an em-

ployee. !7e have stressed,
among other things, the aim
that average purchasers of
insurance are entitled to the

fiduciary one. Agents should
be required to use their ex-

lier NewJersey case of
ALlstate Ins. Co.16

stand their unfamiliar and
technical language and awkward and unclear

to negotiation, in the case of
the average person, as to
terms and provisions and
quite unintelligrble to the
insured even were he to attempt to read and under-

Pace 34

liability coverage of $5,000,000,
and UIM limits of only $L5,000,
the statutory minimum in Nev¡
Jersey atthat time. The court
found the agent had a duty to exercise'þood faith and reasonable
skill in procuring the insurance
sought or needed by his client"
and indicated the client was
"entitled to rely on the special skill
and knowledge possessed by the
agent in order to best obtain the
desired coverage."

The Agent's Duty to Advise the
Insured when the Carrier has
Dropped or Reduced Coverage

broad measure of protection
necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations; that it
is the insurer's burden to
obtain, through its repre-

Does the agent or broker
hzve a duty to advise the insured
when the insurer drops or reduces

sentatives, all information
peftinent to the risk and the
desired coverage before the
contract is issued; and that
it is likewise its obligation
to make policy provisions,
especially those relating to

Wassetman v. Whaftonle the
plaintifî W assermans were struck
by a taxicab while crossing an intersection. They were insured by
Newark Insurance Company for
auto coverage including BI limits
of $100,000/$300,000 but no UIM

coverage, exclusions and

coverage. In fact, UIM coverage
had at one time been part of their
auto policy package, apparently
provided without separate premium, until the insurer sent them
written notice canceling it and advising of the optron to purchase it
for a separate premium.
l7asserman did not understand the
import or gravamen of the insurer's notice and did not purchase
UIM coverage. The taxicab that
struck l7assermans only carried
the minimum mandatory limits of
BI coverage of $1 5,000/$30,000.
Wassermans sued their broker contending that the broker had
a duty to explain the import of the
insurer's notice and to recommend
to them purchase of an appropri-

vital conditions, plain, clear
and prominent to the
layman.
The Sobotor court concluded that the agent must "deal
with laypeople as laypeople and
not as experts in subtleties of
law."17

We have realistically faced
up to the factthat insurance
policies are complex contracts of adhesion, prepared
by the insurer, not subiect

simply to "cover us." The agent
arranged $500,000 BI limits, excess

ln Walker v. Atlantic
Chrysler Plynouth, fnc.rll the
NewJersey court found that the
agent had a duty to recommend
that the insured obtain greater
UIM coverage even though the
insuted had not requested (as in
Sobotol "the best available coverzge" or gven any specific instructions for coverâge. There, the insured business's instructions were

Z coverage and to recommend optional replacement coverage? In

ate amount of

UIM

coverage. T'he
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purchased
in 1963 with liabiliry limits of
The-appeilate
$25,000. In successive renewals
broker.
to-th"
-".,t
over more than2í years, Allstate
a
that
court said the proposition
agents had never recommended
broker does not have a duty in all
circumstances to explain available increasing the limits of liability in
spite of upward trends in costs,
coverage cannot be used to iustift
..not aãvising a long-term client
liability verdicts, and inflation in
that critical covappellate court reversed the trial
.ãrrr,,, grant of summary iudg-

owners insurance first

specific representation by the
agent or broker. Though the court
disagreed with the insurer's argument that the duty would be impossible to fulfill, it noted that the
insurers had not been alerted to
the possible duty by ptior case law
or legislation and that it was

"difficult to fix

erage which he

is
not only being
unilateially
withdrawn but
is replaceable at
nominal
charge." (Ihe

àProPosed drrtY."

already has

Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually
set the limit on the duty of agents or brokers to
recommend additional coverage to their clients.

advised
$100,000/
g300,000 UIM coverage limits for
under $L0.)
broker could have

ìØassermans to buy

Limits on the Duty in
NewJersey
Ultrmatel¡ New Jersey developed what its Supreme Court
has described as a'þroliferation
of cases dealing generally with
the duty of brokers and agents to

-.-.general. Similady, the other defendant homeor¡¿ner in the case

policy in 1977 with a
liability
limit that was
$25,000
bought

a

never increased. Judgment was entered against each defendant who
in turn asserted claims against their
insurers for failing to advise them

insureds concerning UM/UIM
co.v et? ge." 20 Nevertheless, the
NewJersey Supreme Court eventually set the limit on the duty of

to increase their liability coverage. Allstate's insured homeowner assigned his potential
claims against ¡{llstate to the injured plaintiff for a promise not
to execute against that defendant
on the judgment.
The issue that ultimately

agents or brokers to recommend

reached the NewJersey Supreme

additional covetage to their clients. In Chen Lin Vang v.
Allstate Ins. Co.21in 199L, the
NewJersey Supreme Court refused to find a general duty on the

Court was whether an insurer
owes a general duty to advise the
client regarding the necessity of
increasing coverage amounts. The
court agreed that the duties devel-

paft of insurance agents and
brokers to advise their insureds
of the possible need for higher
policy limits upon renewal of the

oped in the

policy.

That case involved severe
injuries to plaintrff whose auto
collided with a tree as a result of
her attempt to avoid two dogs
playing in the streets. She ultimately incurred a stipulated $L.2
million in damages. One of the
owners of the dogs had home-
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UIM auto

coverage

like Sobototandits progeny
cited above also applied to agents
and brokers in homeovzner's coverage. However, the court refused
the invitation to find a general
duty to review and recommend
increased coverage indicating it
would only do so in showings of
"special citcumstances" which it
did not find in Chen Lin Wang.
The court noted the absence of a
specific request by the insured or
cases

The Duty to
Recommend
UIM in Other
Jurisdictions
The agent's dutY
to explain and recommend UIM
coverage is recognized in at least
one other jurisdiction. In 1981,
during a period when Minnesota
had no statute requiring UIM to
be offered, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Cailson v.
Mutual Seruice Ins.zz that, under
common law, zrt insurance agent
can have a duty to offer, advise, or
furnish insurance coverage to an
insured provided that the special
circumstances surrounding the
transaction and the relationship of
the agent with the insured create
such a duty. (t\4innesota now statu-

torily requires the offer of UIM
covenge.B) In the Connecticut
case of Dimeo v. Butns, Btooks
& McNeilr2a the court also affirmed a"duty to explain uninsured motorist coverage and the
consequences ofnot having sufficient coverage." Though the case
involves UM and not UIM coverage, it may be persuasive precedent.

On the other hand, Missouri
appellate courts consistently refu se
to find such a duty and are reluctant even to fìnd any fiduciary duty
in the relationship of the insurance
agent with the client. In Fatmets
fns. Co., fnc. v. McCathy,zs the
Missouri court recognized only the
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agent's duty to procure insurance and to

Conclusioú

inform the client if the insurance ordered can't be procured, but rejected
any duty to advise the insured of the
availabìlity or advisability of UIM coverâge. The court found such a duty
would to be too burdensome for the
insurers, would make them financial
advisers, would require them to shoulder the insured's responsibility, would
possibly require them to advise of bet-

So long as Montana has no statute requiring that UIM coverage be offered by auto carriers in the same manner as UM coveràge, many auto insurance consumers in Montana. ate going to lack

UIM protection solely because the agents or brokers upon whom
they rely will not explain the coverage to them and recommend
that they buy it in adequate amounts. There should be no question
that it would be unreasonable for ân auto insurance agent to neglect to explain and recommend UIM coverage to the insured.
ìØhat excuse can there be for selling an insured $300,000 limits of
BI coverage and then not encouraging them to protect their own
farrlily with UIM coverage in the same amount if available?
It is time for trial lawyers to advocate the good faith extension of Montana common lavz to impose a duty on auto.insurance
agents to offer UIM coverage. Insurers have entered a "tight market" again, and there is evidence that it may be in their interest to
act.nlly discourage the purchase of UIM coverage which is a necessary protection in a state like Montana where so many people
carry mandatory minimum limits of BI coverage.
The problem of auto insurance agents neglecting to advise
consumers of the existence of UIM coverage can be remedied by
statutorily requiring insurers to offer it just as they do UM coverage. The present statute requiring carriers to offer UM, MCA

ter coverage at other companies, and
would allow clients to assert after the
fact that they would have bought the
coverage had they known. The court
noted the absence oî any statute in l\4rssouri requiring UIM coverage and refused to act by "judicial fiat."
In Banes u. Maftinrz; znd Clifton
v. Allstate Ins. Co.rzz Missouri courts
summarily rejected the duty even though
the insureds in each case asked for "full
coverage" and were provided policies
with no UIM coverage. The court in
Banes noted that the client did not speci$r what "full coverage" included and

did not say what she wanted in addition to her previous policy coverages.
The court held the agent"had no duty
under the facts of this case to advise
Banes of underinsured motorist coverage." In Clifton, the court said agents
rn Missouri "hàve no general duty to
advise customers of their particular insurance needs or ofoptronal coverage
that rnay be available " citing the fact that
the insurer had mailed out a written notice of avulability of UIM coverâge.

In the Kentucky case of MuIIíns
v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.r28 the
court found no duty of the agent to advise the insured of UIM coverage but, in
doing so, said that there could be such
a duty if the course of dealing over an
extended period of time would put the
agent on notice that the insured was
seeking and relying on the advice or if
the insured clearly asked for the advice. ,{,lso, the court indicated that an
agent could assume such a duty if their
advettising said they advised or held
themselves out as insurance advisers.
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Fighting for Public Justice:
Cases and Trial Lawyers That Made a Difference

By Wesley J. Smith,
./'oreword hy Erin Brockovich

Ge.ry Spence says,'oEveryone v/ho cares
about justice should buy this book!"
Fighting./ör Puhlic Justice: Ca.ses and Trial
Lawyers Thal Made a Dffirence shows what
our civil justice system is about - trial lawyers battling for people
against power. This book focuses on cases brought by Trial Lawyer
of the Year Award finalists and winners in the first two decades of
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, a national public interest raw firm.
By recounting the dramatic facts of their cases,
Public Justice documents the crucial
role of ourjury system and trial lawyers in exposing
the truth and holding wrongdoers accountable. And
it proves that trial lawyers - working individually

20 YEARS Fighting./or

-

and together - can be an enorrnously powerful force

for the public good.
To order, go to TLPJ's homepage at www.tlpj.org,
e-mai I janderso@tlpj. org, or call 202-7 97 -8600.
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533-23-20L, could easily be
amended to include UIM coverage. Drafters would need to add a

definition of an underinsured motor vehicle. Ideall¡ the statute
should incoqporate the language
of the "Damages I-ess Limits"2e
coverage Form. Under that language, an underinsured motor vehicle is one for which the available
liability insurance limits are not
adequate to cover the insured's
tort damages. Á,nother option is
to incorporate language from the

"Limits I-ess Limits" or'Difference
of the Limits"3o coverage form
thereby defining an underinsured
motor vehicle as one having bodily iniury liability limits less than
the UIM limits of the insured
plaintiffs auto. For the consumer,
the "Damages Less Limits" provision would be most advantageous
because the "Difference of the
Limits" provision can result in
coverage that is illusory. For example, if the BI coverage on the
tortfeasor's vehicle has the same
limit as the UIM coverage on the
plaintiffs vehicle, there is no
'funder-insured motor vehicle"
under the "Difference of the Limits" form, so that plarntiff gets no
benefit from the UIM coverage
even though the declarations page
shows a. sepa:tate premium that the
insured may have been paying for
years. States like NewJersey3l and
Cahfoni*2 require the auto carriers to offer UIM coverage just as
they do with UM, while others like
Minnesota33 outright require the
auto owners to purchase UIM
coverage. It is unlikely that one
could muster the political support

to require that owners carry UM
and UIM coverage, so the former
option is more realistic.
Statutorily requiring that
UIM be offered provides UIM
coverage z ceúain degree of Protection that it will not otherwise
have. Because UM coverage is offered under statutory mandate, it is
considered a " mzndatory" coverage by the Montana Supreme
Court which does not allow insurers to include in their policies offsets, conditions, and other provisions that may in fact reduce the
UM coverage below the statutory
minimums. For example, tn SuIlÍvan v. Doela the court invalidated
the "workers' compensation offset" because it could reduce the
UM coverage below the statLltoly
minimum. In McGIynn u. Safeco
fns. Co.r3s the court invalidated
the requirement of 'þhysical contact" between cars in hit-and-run
uninsured motorist accidents on
the ground that the UM stahrte
contained no such condition. Such
offsets and conditions may defeat
UIM coverage because it lacks
statutory protection.
One thing is certain: Auto
ìnsurance consumers in Montana
need the legislative protection of
an act requiring auto insurers to
offer UIM coverage or the judicial
protection of cases placing on auto
agents and brokers the duty to explain and recommend UIM coverage. Either solution requires advocates who can persuade the respective branch of government of
the necessity of this protection for
consumers. It sounds like another
job for the advocates of the MTI-A..
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